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This Article examines the significance of the 4/40 work week to caregivers 
in need of individualized workplace accommodation.  Employer interest in 
4/40 and other alternative work structures demonstrates that the current 
organization of market work is not inevitable and that its re-organization in 
ways that facilitate full participation by caregivers can sometimes be mutually 
beneficial.  Yet it is unlikely that employers act optimally in responding to 
individual accommodation requests.  Well-known limits on individuals’ 
ability to exercise rational choice can impede supervisory determinations 
as to whether a particular accommodation will effectively enable the 
caregiver to perform her job and whether the costs entailed in adopting the 
accommodation will be outweighed by other savings.  Thus, it is likely that 
some number of viable, cost-effective accommodations are not being 
implemented by employers.  
This Article argues that the law should play a role in facilitating optimal, 
individualized accommodation of working caregivers.  Drawing on existing 
and pending legislation, it argues for the creation of a statutory “right to 
request” that would protect workers from retaliation for seeking 
accommodations and would require employers to consider such requests in 
good faith.  By encouraging workers to come forward with their requests and 
requiring parties to engage in an “interactive process,” the law can 
potentially reduce some of the biases and informational gaps that currently 
plague discretionary employer decisions about accommodation requests.  In 
this way, such a law may ultimately inspire mutually beneficial changes to 
work structure that could not be achieved absent legal intervention. 
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Incenting Flexibility:                                                 
The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary 
Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance 
RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A central feature of market work is employers’ expectation that full-
time workers will perform eight hours per day, five days per week, and on-
site at the employer’s facility.  Legal scholars concerned with the position 
of working caregivers have critiqued this “full-time face-time” (“FTFT”) 
norm as reflecting the life patterns of men who generally require no time 
off for childrearing and can depend on a steady stream of unpaid domestic 
labor supplied by a female spouse.1  Despite the rhetorical power of this 
claim, mainstream work structures like the FTFT norm have proved 
particularly difficult to eradicate through legal regulation.  Even in areas 
where the law actually compels firms to alter their employment practices 
for the benefit of nontraditional workers, truly transformative changes are 
quite rare.  For instance, under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”),2 which requires employers to reasonably accommodate disabled 
workers, courts have often treated the FTFT norm as a backstop that limits 
what types of workplace accommodations will be considered reasonable.3 
                                                                                                                          
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law 
School; L.L.M., Temple University School of Law.  I am grateful for the assistance and feedback 
received from W. David Barnes, Diane Burkhardt, Emily Grabham, Eli Wald, and the Colorado 
Employment Law Faculty (“CELF”) Scholarship Group (Roberto Corrada, Melissa Hart, Martin Katz, 
Scott Moss, Helen Norton, Nantiya Ruan, Raja Raghunath, and Catherine Smith).  Special thanks to 
student research assistants Geoffrey Frazier, Sarah Millard, and Lindsay Noyce. 
1 See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 
359 (2003) (discussing the disparate impact on women of “full-time face-time” work requirements in 
the context of telecommuting); see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND 
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 64–66, 113 (2000) (describing how market work is 
structured around an ideal worker who has no household or caregiving responsibilities). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
3 See, e.g., Denczak v. Ford Motor Co., 215 Fed. App’x 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that 
“[c]ommon sense, to say nothing of [defendant’s] business judgment, supports the point” that a 
production quota in an assembly line is an essential function of a welding job because such positions 
“are only as fast as the slowest member of the production team”); Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 
F.3d 1301, 1303–06 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a utility company was not required to limit an 
employee’s hours to eight hours per day because mandatory overtime was an essential function of the 
job); Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 37 P.3d 333, 337 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a software 
company was not required to accommodate plaintiff by allowing him to work a forty-hour week where 
the unrebutted evidence demonstrated “that all systems engineers within the department had 
consistently worked 60–80 hours per week for years”); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, 
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Recent changes by some employers, however, call into question the 
inviolate nature of current work structures.  Several companies and 
government employers have instituted or proposed compressed work 
weeks and other forms of alternative scheduling to deal with budgetary 
shortfalls in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008.4  Most such 
initiatives tinker at the edges of the FTFT norm.  For example, a plan 
announced by the Utah state government in June 2008 requires state 
employees to maintain the same number of full-time hours, but spreads 
their work over fewer days (the so-called “4/40” week).5  Employees 
benefit by obtaining one full weekday “off” per week.6  Such changes are 
far from the wholesale reform of market work that some legal scholars 
have envisioned.7  These voluntary initiatives, however, have been touted 
as both efficiency-enhancing for employers and supportive of the life and 
family needs of employees.8  Moreover, they are voluntary undertakings 
that have emerged absent legal compulsion and outside the discourse over 
equal employment quality for caregivers. 
                                                                                                                          
Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initiative in a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. 
WOMEN & L. 345, 363–67 (2003) (describing this phenomenon and discussing cases in which courts 
limit the reach of individualized accommodation under the ADA); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the 
Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 23–36 
(2005) (providing examples of courts refusing to require accommodations that varied employees’ 
hours, punctuality, attendance, start and stop times, and on-site work requirements). 
4 See Colleen McCarthy, Employers Offer Benefits To Offset Higher Fuel Prices, BUS. INS., Sept. 
1, 2008, at 27 (reporting survey results finding that twenty-two percent of employer respondents 
planned to offer a four-day work week option to at least some employees); Josée Valcourt & Justin 
Scheck, Oil Prices Prompt Four-Day Week, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A3 (describing various 
states’ efforts to reduce the work week to four days “to provide relief from the cost of commuting”); cf. 
Hannah Seligson, An Alternative to Layoffs: The Shorter Workweek, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at 
BU11 (detailing a New York policy center’s switch of some employees to a three-day, twenty-four-
hour work week at reduced pay). 
5 See Brock Vergakis, Utah’s 4-Day Workweek Draws Out-of-State Attention, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Feb. 25, 2009 (explaining that under Utah’s four-day work week, 17,000 state employees now 
work four ten-hour days each week). 
6 See STATE OF UTAH, WORKING 4 UTAH: INITIATIVE PERFORMANCE REPORT, FINAL 16 (2009), 
available at http://www.dhrm.utah.gov/Working4Utah_FinalReport_Dec2009.pdf (showing that, based 
on employee survey results, almost seventy-five percent of respondents prefer the four-day work 
week); 4-Day Workweek Creates New Volunteers in Utah, USA TODAY, July 10, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-07-10-utah-volunteers_N.htm (reporting that the “extra 
day off” allows employees an opportunity to engage in volunteer activities). 
7 See Vicki Schultz, Essay, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1941 (2000) (envisioning a 
vast overhaul of market work in which “the state sustains suitable work for everyone: providing jobs, 
guaranteeing a living wage, cultivating empowering working conditions and relations, restructuring 
working time, and providing the job-holding services necessary to allow people to pursue paid work 
along with broader care commitments and civic activities”); Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The 
Need for a Reduced Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 140–41 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 
2006) (proposing far-reaching changes to the American work environment, including a reduction of the 
standard work week from forty hours to thirty-five hours for all employees). 
8 See McCarthy, supra note 4 (describing the compressed work week as one of “a variety of 
benefits to alleviate the impact of higher gasoline prices”); Vergakis, supra note 5 (reporting that 
Utah’s four-day work week initiative would cut greenhouse gas emissions and reduce gasoline 
consumption, and finding that “the schedule offers more flexibility” for affected employees). 
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What does the emergence of an employer-initiated, 4/40 week mean 
for working caregivers?  What does it mean to scholars seeking to alter the 
structure of market work through legal reform?  This Article examines this 
trend through the lens of individual accommodation—workers’ need for 
and employers’ willingness to provide idiosyncratic changes in job 
requirements or workplace structures to meet the demands of particular 
caregivers.  From the perspective of these workers, voluntary 4/40 is 
potentially, though not inherently, transformative.  Its emergence illustrates 
the viability of win-win accommodations that benefit both caregivers and 
their employers.  At least in some cases, the interests of caregivers and 
traditional workers elide.9 
At the same time, however, voluntary 4/40 reminds us that employees 
in an at-will system remain subject at all times to employers’ unilateral 
changes in work structure—a reality that may more heavily burden 
caregivers whose personal responsibilities are likely to be schedule- 
dependent.  The inherent limitation of 4/40, or any other employer-
sponsored reform, is that such initiatives are neither motivated by, nor 
comprehensive of, the needs of working caregivers.  For voluntary 
restructuring efforts to constitute an effective, long-term component of a 
larger reform agenda, as this Article contends they must, employers must 
undertake those efforts in response to employee demands and not solely in 
response to catastrophic financial circumstances, like those currently 
facing many state governments. 
This Article argues that the law has a role both in encouraging and 
mediating this type of voluntary and individualized accommodation.  It 
argues for the creation of statutory procedural rights that enable and protect 
caregivers in seeking alternative work arrangements.  This approach has 
been adopted successfully abroad10 and has been proposed domestically in 
                                                                                                                          
9 Legal scholarship has long emphasized such synergies.  See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Canaries in 
the Mine: Work/Family Conflict and the Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221, 2227 (2002) (arguing that 
“the business case for providing usable part-time programs demonstrates that the savings attributable to 
reduced attrition far outweigh any arguable higher overhead”); Joan C. Williams, The Family-Hostile 
Corporation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 924 (2002) (same); Joan C. Williams, The Politics of Time 
in the Legal Profession, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 379, 398–403 (2007) (arguing “the business case for 
work-life balance in the legal profession”); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal 
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 77, 85–89 (2003) (making the business case for “family-responsive policies”); cf. Michelle A. 
Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits 
Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 311–14 (2009) (summarizing how non-disabled 
workers stand to benefit from employer accommodation of disabled individuals). 
10 See, e.g., Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts2002/pdf/ukpga_20020022_en.pdf (giving British parents of children under the age of seventeen 
the right to request flexible work); Employment Relations (Flexible Working Arrangements) 
Amendment Act 2007, No. 105, Public Act, Part 6AA (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation. 
govt.nz/act/public/2007/0105/latest/DLM1034656.html?search=ts_act_Flexible+working_noresel&p=1 
(granting New Zealand employees “a statutory right to request a variation of their working 
arrangements if they have the care of any person”).  A study of a similar German law concluded that 
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a pending congressional bill.11  Its ultimate effectiveness, however, will 
depend on regulatory and judicial interpretation of the scope of employers’ 
procedural obligations.  Thus, this Article contends that such legislation 
should be understood to impose an employer obligation to engage in a 
good faith “interactive process”12 when faced with an explicit 
accommodation request by an individual caregiver. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part II situates voluntary 4/40 within 
the context of existing legal regulation pertaining to the status of working 
caregivers.  It demonstrates that 4/40 suffers the weaknesses associated 
with fixed mandates, such as the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 
which are not flexible enough to account for individual needs.  Part III 
makes the case for legislation aimed at inspiring voluntary behavior at the 
individual level, exploring the basic economics of voluntary 
accommodations decisions.  It suggests that well-known limits on rational 
choice theory may lead to sub-optimal voluntary accommodation of 
individual requests.  Part IV demonstrates how the law may respond to 
these limitations, and uses the pending Working Families Flexibility Act as 
an illustration.  This Article concludes that a modest and carefully 
developed procedural right requiring employers to consider caregiver 
accommodation requests in good faith is likely to inspire beneficial and 
cost-effective changes to work structure that might not have been achieved 
absent legal intervention. 
II.  VOLUNTARY 4/40 AND THE LEGAL PROTECTION                                                
OF WORKING CAREGIVERS 
The emergence of 4/40 is particularly propitious given the state of the 
workplace reform movement.  The project of advancing the position of 
caregivers and other non-traditional workers through legal rule making has 
achieved much over the last three decades.13  It is unclear, however, how 
                                                                                                                          
nine out of ten requests were accepted by employers, while a study of a comparable Dutch law found 
that six out of ten requests for reduced working time were fully accepted and one out of ten was 
partially accepted.  See Ariane Hegewisch, Employers and European Flexible Working Rights: When 
the Floodgates Were Opened, WORKLIFE LAW (UC Hastings College of the Law, S.F., Cal.), Fall 
2005, at 2, available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/european_issue_brief_printversion. 
pdf. 
11 See Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a bill “to 
permit employees to request, and to ensure employers consider requests for, flexible work terms and 
conditions”). 
12 Employers are currently compelled to do this in the disability accommodation context.  See 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3) (2009) (“To determine the appropriate 
reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive 
process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.  This process 
should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable 
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”); see also infra Part IV. 
13 Key developments in achieving greater inclusion and equal treatment of working caregivers 
include the passage of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006), and the 
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much more reform can be achieved through legal channels, particularly 
with respect to those disparities that result from long-standing structural 
features of work and other “unconscious” behaviors or practices.14  For this 
reason, voluntary action by employers emerges as a natural focus for 
furthering the goal of equal employment quality for non-traditional 
workers.  The question for legal scholars is whether such efforts will be 
initiated, implemented, and maintained solely by employers motivated by 
financial interests, or whether the law has a role in directing those efforts 
toward the interests of caregivers and ensuring they are actually served. 
This section sets the stage for that question.  It argues that 4/40 
programs offer some of the benefits associated with mandated benefits 
legislation, but suffer from the same limitation: a lack of flexibility 
necessary to address the unique needs of particular workers. 
A.  A Taxonomy of Legal Protections 
Legal interventions to benefit working caregivers in the United States 
have come in two forms—anti-discrimination laws and mandated benefits 
laws—and can be associated with two distinct reform strategies.15  The 
first, anti-discrimination laws (and their strategic use in litigation), aims to 
eradicate stereotypes and other forms of conscious or unconscious bias that 
result in differential treatment of caregivers under existing workplace rules 
and practices.  Laws embodying this approach include the federal 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”)16 and, at the state level, laws that 
directly prohibit discrimination on the basis of “family responsibilities.”17  
                                                                                                                          
development of the “family responsibilities” discrimination theory, which has been recognized by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Enforcement Guidance. See EEOC, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING 
RESPONSIBILITIES (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [hereinafter 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance] (describing situations in which disparate treatment of caregivers may 
constitute unlawful disparate treatment on the basis of gender). 
14 This problem of structural discrimination, or what I have referred to in earlier writing as 
“structural exclusion,” has become a principal concern of legal scholars focusing on the eradication of 
employment discrimination.  See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: 
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91 
(2003) (indicating that “discrimination often operates in the workplace today less as a blanket policy or 
discrete, identifiable decision to exclude than as a perpetual tug on opportunity and advancement”); 
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 458, 468–74 (2001) (describing the problem of “second generation discrimination” as “patterns of 
interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant groups”).  On the 
challenges of eradicating the disparate effects of structural exclusion through legal rule making, see 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 485–
92 (2000); Sturm, supra, at 475–78. 
15 I set forth this binary framework in greater detail in a prior article.  Rachel Arnow-Richman, 
Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal 
Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 36–44. 
16 The PDA is an amendment to Title VII providing that discrimination on the basis of “sex” 
includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
17 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2008) (making “parenthood” a protected characteristic 
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These measures prohibit differential treatment under employers’ existing 
standards and practices and are critical to ensuring that caregivers who are 
able to perform on par with traditional workers are treated equally. 
By and large, however, such efforts do not address the needs of those 
caregivers who require some deviation in existing standards to 
accommodate the demands of their families.18  The second approach, 
mandated benefits laws and related accommodation strategies, seeks to fill 
that gap.  These laws require employers to adopt or alter certain practices 
to address particular needs.  The principal example of this approach on the 
federal level is the FMLA, which grants eligible workers twelve weeks of 
unpaid leave upon the birth or adoption of a child or to care for a family 
member with a serious health condition.19  Several states go further, 
providing some paid leave for FMLA-qualifying events;20 extending 
unpaid leave to routine parental activities, such as participating in school-
related activities;21 and requiring employers to provide distinct benefits 
such as lactation rooms for breastfeeding mothers.22  As these examples 
                                                                                                                          
under an unlawful employment practices statute); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2010) (prohibiting 
discrimination in employment on the basis of “family responsibilities”).  While federal law does not 
directly protect caregivers as a class, the prohibition on gender discrimination has been used 
strategically to achieve such results in some instances.  See Williams & Segal, supra note 9, at 122–61 
(laying out a strategy for pursuing “family responsibilities discrimination” as gender discrimination and 
offering successful case examples). 
18 Several scholars have criticized the anti-discrimination approach to rectifying caregiver 
exclusion on these and similar grounds.  See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment 
Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal 
Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 386–87 (2001) (critiquing liberal theory and equality norms as 
incapable of addressing the women’s disproportionate caregiving responsibilities and their detrimental 
effects on women’s participation in market work); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for 
Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16–40 
(2010) (comparing European and American family leave policy and criticizing “the unintended 
consequences of antidiscrimination law’s role in addressing work-family conflict in the United States”). 
19 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006).  Although not the focus of this Article, the FMLA also 
covers a worker’s leave to care for her own serious health condition.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) 
(2006).  More recently, the FMLA was amended to provide leave for workers to attend to personal 
responsibilities occasioned by the deployment of a family member serving in the military.  29 
U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(E) (West 2009). 
20 See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300–3301 (West 2004) (providing an eligible employee 
up to six weeks of wage replacement benefits when taking time off work to care for a seriously ill 
child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, or to bond with a minor child within one year of the birth or 
placement of the child in connection with foster care or adoption). 
21 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(a)–(b)(1) (West 2004) (granting eligible 
employees twenty-four hours of school-related leave during any twelve-month period to “participate in 
school activities directly related to the educational advancement of a son or daughter of the employee, 
such as parent-teacher conferences or interviewing for a new school”); see also Kirsten K. Davis, 
Extending the Vision: An Empowerment Identity Approach to Work-Family Regulation as Applied to 
School Involvement Leave Statutes, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2010) (contrasting 
the level of accommodation among ten states and the District of Columbia that currently have school 
involvement leave legislation). 
22 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1030–1031 (West 2002) (requiring employers to provide a 
reasonable amount of break time to accommodate employees wishing to express milk at work and 
requiring the employer to make “reasonable efforts to provide the employee with the use of a room or 
other location . . . for the employee to express milk in private”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-20-2 (West 
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suggest, mandated benefits laws that target working caregivers are similar 
to, though not co-extensive with, accommodation laws that seek to rectify 
disparities in the employment quality of caregivers.  Under mandated 
benefits laws, workers who meet a set of qualifying conditions obtain a 
particular benefit (or accommodation) that other workers do not.  
Depending on how narrowly the eligible group is defined, the benefit looks 
less like a universal entitlement and more like an accommodation.  Thus, 
the FMLA identifies workers with a new child or seriously ill family 
member as one protected group.  This group is arguably broader than the 
group benefited under state parental involvement legislation (parents of 
school-aged children who engage in particular, qualifying school 
activities), and that group is broader than the group benefited under state 
lactation laws (breastfeeding mothers). 
This characterization of mandated benefits laws, however, differs in 
significant ways from the common notion of accommodation, which is 
drawn largely from the law of disability accommodation.23  Unlike 
reasonable accommodation, which is required in that context, mandated 
benefits laws are inflexible.  Thus, the FMLA benefits the worker who 
wants—and is financially able—to take twelve unpaid weeks to care for a 
newborn.  It does not serve the interests of the worker who prefers—or is 
compelled financially—to immediately re-enter the workplace following 
childbirth but would like to use her leave time to work a reduced schedule.  
Neither does it allow that same worker to return to work full-time and use 
her leave to take three unpaid breaks per day to pump breast milk.24 
To be clear, my critique here resonates with, but is distinct from, long-
standing concerns about the reach and scope of the FMLA.  Legal scholars 
have expressed significant frustration with the limits of the FMLA in terms 
of how much leave it provides, the limited purposes for which leave is 
authorized, and the fact that it is unpaid.25  I share the view that three 
months of unpaid leave merely scratches the surface in terms of what a 
                                                                                                                          
2009) (requiring employers to provide a clean and private space, excluding a bathroom, near the 
employee’s workspace, in addition to flexible break times, for nursing employees to express milk); see 
also Lara M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring Employer 
Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 284–85 (2002) (discussing 
various state law mandates as to the level of workplace accommodation for breastfeeding mothers). 
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (defining the term “discriminate” to include “not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability”). 
24 While the FMLA does allow for “intermittent leave,” the employer must allow such leave only 
when “medically necessary” due to the serious health condition of the employee or a covered family 
member.  See 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 (2009). 
25 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 237 (describing the FMLA as a “drop in the bucket”); 
Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values and Moral Code 
Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 81 (2000) (“[B]y 
providing only emergency or short-term coverage . . . the benefits provided by the [FMLA] are more 
symbolic than they are real.”). 
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primary caregiver needs following the birth or adoption of a new child.26  
My point, however, is that even for those workers for whom three months 
of total leave time is adequate, the law does not grant the worker the 
flexibility to use that entitlement in the way that he or she might find it 
most helpful.27  To obtain that type of accommodation, one would require 
either very tailored, detailed rules or an open-ended reasonable 
accommodation mandate like that which exists under the ADA.  Figure 1 
demonstrates the relationship between these rules and strategies. 
 
Figure 1 
 
On the far left side is the broad equality principle of federal anti-
discrimination law that requires gender parity, but neither protects 
caregivers per se nor accommodates that activity.  Family responsibility 
discrimination laws go one step further, explicitly making caregivers a 
protected class, but still requiring nothing more than equal treatment.  The 
FMLA represents the jump to a mandated benefits approach, providing a 
fixed benefit for two discrete caregiving needs.  To the right of the FMLA 
are state laws that create greater flexibility for caregivers, focusing on the 
longer term, day-to-day burdens of caregiving, such as the need to 
breastfeed infants or manage and participate in a child’s schooling. 
There is, however, a natural limit to the details with which caregiving 
benefits can be legislated.  Setting aside the important question of how 
                                                                                                                          
26 See Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 845 (2002) (noting that 
“twelve weeks falls far short of what child development experts believe is minimally necessary” for 
post-partum recovery). 
27 For additional examples of how statutory inflexibility renders FMLA benefits of limited 
usefulness to some caregivers, see Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 
31–36. 
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such mandates would be funded, it is unclear how law makers would 
extend laws like school involvement legislation to provide workers with 
the requisite flexibility to accommodate all of the particular needs of their 
families without creating a highly complex and unwieldy system of rules.  
The recent Military Leave Amendments to the FMLA offer a telling 
counter-example.  Passed with little fanfare or public attention as part of 
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008,28 these amendments 
require employers to provide FMLA leave to employees experiencing a 
“qualifying exigency” as a result of a family member serving or called to 
active duty in the Armed Forces.29  The regulations interpreting this 
provision define “qualifying exigency” with incredible breadth and detail.  
Included are personal responsibilities attending to a short-term 
deployment, participation or attendance at military events or ceremonies, 
arranging alternative childcare or providing emergency childcare as a result 
of deployment, making personal financial or legal arrangements relating to 
deployment, sharing rest and relaxation time with service members on 
leave, and involvement in post-deployment activities.30  The regulations 
then further define each of these categories of exigencies.31 
The military amendments illustrate the type of forethought and detailed 
drafting that would be necessary to fully address the situation of working 
caregivers through legal rule making.  One might be tempted to view these 
amendments as blueprints for more comprehensive and inclusive work/life 
legislation for civilian caregivers.32  The military amendments, however, 
apply to a tiny swath of the working population (only family members of 
military personnel), are triggered by one particular life event (deployment 
or active duty), and provide a single form of accommodation (unpaid 
leave).  It is a far different problem to provide varied and flexible benefits 
for the wide range of needs faced by ordinary working caregivers, which 
might be best addressed though temporary or permanent schedule changes, 
alterations of work structures, or other accommodations short of, or in 
addition to, leave time.33  Moreover, the military amendments were passed 
                                                                                                                          
28 Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 585 (2008). 
29 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(E) (West 2009). 
30 29 CFR § 825.126(a) (2009). 
31 Id. 
32 See Marcy Karin, Time Off for Military Families: An Emerging Case Study in a Time of 
War . . . And the Tipping Point for Future Laws Supporting Work-Life Balance?, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 
46, 48 (2009) (questioning whether the amendments “represent a paradigm shift in the way legislators 
(and society) think about work-life policy”). 
33 Scholars from different fields have noted the challenges faced by regulators in designing 
optimal rules.  See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management To Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 703–04 (2003) (suggesting 
that the transaction costs involved in researching, selecting, and implementing legal rules may make it 
difficult for law makers to devise highly detailed rules that appropriately balance social benefits and 
costs to firms and that retain sufficient flexibility to account for future change); see also Sturm, supra 
note 14, at 475 (“Any rule specific enough to guide behavior will inadequately account for the 
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in a unique political climate, when national attention was focused on the 
War on Terror and the need to support American troops.34  Therefore, 
while I am reasonably optimistic that the military amendments will prove 
successful for their narrow purpose,35 I do not believe they provide a 
realistic blueprint for broadly dealing with work/life conflict. 
The alternative, and arguably more suitable, method for legislating 
accommodation, given the nuanced needs of a heterogeneous population, is 
through a reasonable accommodation mandate.  Although proposed by 
some scholars,36 this tack has not been seriously pursued as a strategic 
matter, likely due to the documented resistance of employers to the 
reasonable accommodation mandate of the ADA.37  The principal 
objection to this portion of the ADA has been the costs imposed on 
employers, and that argument no doubt would be levied, not without 
legitimacy, in the context of any regulation requiring accommodation of 
non-traditional workers, whatever its form.38  Setting that policy choice 
aside, however, there are additional problems that come with an open-
ended standard.  Such rules engender significant legal uncertainty about 
the scope of the mandate and the means of compliance, creating a high risk 
of litigation and making it costly for employers to comply.39  This would 
be even more true in the case of reasonable accommodation of caregivers 
                                                                                                                          
variability, change, and complexity characteristic of second generation [discrimination] problems.”). 
34 See Karin, supra note 32, at 52 (acknowledging that the adoption of the Military Leave 
Amendments “was possible because of the nature of the group protected and the fact that America is at 
war”). 
35 To date, there has been no case law interpreting the Military Leave Amendments nor any 
empirical research on their implementation or effect. 
36 See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 18, at 457–59; Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine 
Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 
2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445–48. 
37 See Krieger, Afterword, supra note 14, at 504 (describing backlash against the ADA as 
privileging the disabled at the expense of mainstream workers). 
38 The cost implications of the ADA, and accommodation mandates more broadly, is a vast 
subject that falls outside the scope of this Article.  For extensive discussion of these issues, see John J. 
Donahue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for 
Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 899–903 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, 
Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans 
with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 317–19 (2001); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 225–28 (2000); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability 
Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 167–78 (2003). 
39 See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace 
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1254–55 (2003) (discussing the nebulous quality of the 
language of the ADA, which “provides only a general structure for analysis and gives little guidance to 
help define its scope and limits”); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990: Title I and Its Impact on Employment Decisions, 16 VT. L. REV. 263, 282–87 (1991) (discussing 
cases litigating the meaning of “reasonable accommodation” in the ADA and the difficulty this 
standard imposes on employer compliance).  Cf. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: 
Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 397 (1995) (criticizing the vagueness of the undue hardship 
standard, which presents employers with an uncertain backdrop against which to make decisions to 
accommodate). 
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than it is currently in the context of disability accommodations.  Like the 
beneficiaries of the FMLA Military Leave Amendments, disabled 
individuals comprise a relatively discrete group of workers as compared to 
the universe of workers who will likely face conflicts between work and 
family caregiving.40 
In short, assuming that we would even want to force employers to 
make comprehensive changes, one might question the feasibility of using 
legal rules to achieve that end.  For these reasons, it would be unrealistic to 
expect a comprehensive legal response to the structure of market work and 
its effect on working caregivers. 
B.  The Rise of Voluntary Accommodation 
If comprehensive legal reform of market work is unlikely, voluntary 
accommodation becomes a necessary, and indeed inevitable, bridge 
between the types of changes that some scholars would like to achieve and 
the reality of what regulators can do through legislative action.  The 
question is how useful will employer-sponsored accommodation be for the 
population that most needs it.   
One way to speculate about this question is by looking at 4/40 as an 
example.  Within the schema laid out above, 4/40—and other forms of 
compressed work weeks—analogize best to mandated benefits laws that 
provide a discrete and defined accommodation (one additional day off per 
week).  They also suffer from some of the same limitations that are 
endemic to those statutes when judged from the perspective of caregivers.  
On a practical level, 4/40 is invaluable to the worker who needs a full day 
away from her job to care for a child or an aging parent.  It is not helpful, 
and in fact places additional burdens on the worker who is unable to find 
child or elder care during the early and late hours that a 4/40 work week 
requires.41  Furthermore, a universal 4/40 plan can create a more difficult 
environment for caregivers seeking different or additional 
accommodations.  An employer may feel justified in rejecting an 
employee’s request, however necessary or reasonable, given the 
company’s adoption of what many would consider a generous and 
employee-friendly work schedule. 
                                                                                                                          
40 The 2008 amendments to the ADA expanded the universe of protected employees.  See Alex B. 
Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 218 (2008) (explaining changes to the 
definition of disability).  The protected population remains small, however, compared to the population 
of working caregivers. 
41 See STATE OF UTAH, WORKING 4 UTAH, INITIATIVE PERFORMANCE REPORT, INTERIM DRAFT 
13 (2009), available at http://www.utah.gov/governor/docs/Working4UtahInterimReport.pdf 
[hereinafter WORKING 4 UTAH INTERIM DRAFT] (stating that twelve percent of survey respondents in 
the Utah program reported a negative impact on childcare after implementation of the four-day work 
week). 
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That said, whenever an employer takes a creative approach to work 
structure, caregivers will likely (although not invariably) reap some 
benefit.  In the case of a company that adopts a 4/40 work week, there will 
doubtlessly be a subset of working caregivers for whom one work day off 
per week obviates the need for special accommodations.  Thus, a caregiver 
may be able to schedule family medical appointments, children’s carpools, 
or parent/teacher conferences on the non-work day in lieu of leaving work 
early on particular days or taking time off from work.42  The more 
generous the new form of work is—not just a reduction in days, but a 
reduction in hours; not just a reduction in hours, but enhanced flexibility in 
scheduling hours—the more fluid the norms of the workplace, and the 
more likely it is that scholars can begin to do away with thinking about 
caregivers as a unique class at all.43 
But until that day arrives, legal scholars must contend with this 
question of individual needs.  Currently, individual workplace 
accommodation issues—outside the disability context—are left largely to 
private resolution.  Despite this, voluntary accommodations do occur.  In 
the ADA context, where employers are obligated only to reasonably 
accommodate, research demonstrates that firms frequently grant more 
generous accommodations than the law requires and often to employees 
other than those who are legally protected.44  To some extent, this may be 
explained as a rational response to legal uncertainty.  Particularly in the 
context of tailored mandates, like reasonable accommodation, employers 
will over-comply to reduce the risk of liability or simply the risk of 
litigation.45 
                                                                                                                          
42 See id. (reporting a decrease in employee absenteeism under the four-day work week). 
43 Several scholars have made compelling arguments that the challenges faced by working female 
caregivers will not be resolved by efforts that target women as a distinct class.  See, e.g., Martin H. 
Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1095 (1994) (arguing for greater attention to 
the needs and obligations of fathers because “[g]ender-neutral parental leave policies will not prevent 
such discrimination as long as women dominate the use of family leave”); Schultz, supra note 7, at 
1939 (explaining why reform should focus on making the workplace conducive to the lives of all 
workers so that “[e]veryone would have a right to train for and pursue work of their own choosing, 
and . . . [e]veryone would work saner, and more similar hours, so that all of us would have an 
opportunity to participate fully in family, friendship, politics, and civic life”); Michael Selmi, The 
Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 410–11 (1999) (arguing 
that men should be given incentives, if not forced, to take parental leave). 
44 See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
305, 324–26 (2008) (citing studies demonstrating that employers will choose to accommodate non-
disabled workers when practical to do so); Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations: 
Empirical Study of Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917, 941–42 (2006) (finding in a nationwide 
study of employers who contacted the Job Accommodation Network that forty-three percent of 
accommodated employees did not suffer a substantial limitation of a major life activity); cf. Travis, 
Lashing Back, supra note 9, at 363 (arguing that managerial infrastructure created to comply with the 
ADA benefits non-disabled workers who are able to reap non-costly accommodations). 
45 See Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 63–66 (explaining 
these incentives); Travis, Lashing Back, supra note 9, at 363 (“[E]ven if an employer is fairly certain 
that it could prevail in a potential lawsuit by proving that an employee’s condition is not a statutory 
disability, the employer may find it cost-effective to avoid the risk of defending costly (albeit winning) 
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But that does not explain what happens in the caregiver context where 
there is no background mandate at all.  Despite the absence of legal 
compulsion, numerous employers accommodate caregiving both through 
formal policies, such as paid parental time, and informal accommodation, 
such as allowing employees to return to work gradually following 
childbirth or adoption.46  In addition, recent data suggest that a large 
number of employers offer some degree of flexibility including allowing 
employees to alter start and stop times and work occasionally from home.47  
The emergence of 4/40 explains in part why employers offer such 
accommodations voluntarily—employers see synergies between the life 
needs of workers and the needs of their business.  Thus, the employer may 
regard the choice to accommodate as a good personnel policy, hoping its 
decision will yield enhanced productivity, better workplace morale, or 
reduced turnover.48  Or, as 4/40 suggests, the employer might see gains to 
be harnessed in the form of lower energy consumption or other reductions 
in operating costs.49  Either way, it is mutually beneficial for the parties to 
make these changes. 
III.  THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF INDIVIDUAL ACCOMMODATION 
What does this mean for the law?  Thus far, I have argued both that the 
law’s ability to mandate employer-funded benefits to caregivers is finite, 
and that employers will, in at least some instances, find reasons to provide 
                                                                                                                          
litigation by instead granting the employee’s accommodation request.”); Patrick F. Dorrian, Companies 
Should Be ‘Liberal’ with Leave Requests, 21 CORP. COUNS. WKLY. NEWSL. (BNA), Apr. 12, 2006, at 
115 (recommending that employers err on the side of accommodating whenever an employee makes a 
request as it is difficult to predict who the court will determine to be “disabled”). 
46 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WORK-LIFE BALANCE 
AND THE ECONOMICS OF WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 10–12 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/files/documents/100331-cea-economics-workplace-flexibility.pdf [hereinafter WORK-LIFE 
BALANCE] (noting that 56% of large employers surveyed reported giving paid maternity leave; 47% 
reported allowing most employees to take a few days off to care for ill children without loss of pay; and 
77% allowed some workers to gradually increase hours after childbirth or adoption). 
47 See id. at 4–5, 9 (summarizing surveys in which 79% of large employers reported allowing 
some workers to periodically change their start and stop time, 28%  reported allowing some workers to 
work compressed work weeks, and more than 50% reported allowing some employees to occasionally 
work paid hours at home).  It is important to note, however, that such data are derived from employer 
self-reports and that the percentages refer to the number of employers who offer these benefits to some 
workers.  See id. at 6 (“If many employers only provide a benefit to a minority of their workers, the 
percent of workers with a benefit will be smaller than the percent of firms offering the same benefit.  In 
addition, there may be a difference between an organization’s policies and their implementation.”). 
48 See Williams, The Family-Hostile Corporation, supra note 9, at 924–25 (describing how 
accounting firms Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & Young saved $20 million and at least $25 million, 
respectively, upon implementing flexible schedules due to reduced attrition); Jyoti Thottam, Reworking 
Work, TIME, July 25, 2005, at 50 (discussing how workers are happier and more productive under Best 
Buy’s “results-oriented work environment” program where “employees can work when and where they 
like, as long as they get the job done”). 
49 See WORKING 4 UTAH INTERIM DRAFT, supra note 41, at 4 (citing annual operational cost 
savings of $203,177 in custodial service contracts and energy usage reductions of ten to twenty percent 
in half of the buildings since switching to the four-day work week).  
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such benefits on their own.  One might conclude from this that any further 
legislation on behalf of caregivers is unnecessary or impractical.  But that 
would be wrong for two reasons.  First, there is every reason to suppose 
that continued advocacy can result in modest legislative reform that 
expands, in limited ways, the parameters of existing mandated benefits and 
anti-discrimination laws.  Second, the fact that employers in some 
instances chose to voluntarily accommodate does not mean that they are 
doing so optimally. 
The first point requires little explanation.  As previously discussed, the 
past five years have witnessed several limited but important legal 
expansions of caregiver law at the federal and state levels, including such 
developments as the passage of the FMLA’s Military Leave Amendments, 
the adoption by the EEOC of guidance on family responsibilities 
discrimination, and the enactment of parental involvement laws by many 
states. 
The second is the subject of this section.  Rational choice theory would 
suggest that employers, left to their own devices, will provide individual 
non-compelled accommodations whenever it is in their financial interest to 
do so.  If so, the only role for law is to force employers to provide more 
costly accommodations that they would not otherwise choose to undertake.  
This view, however, betrays an overly simplistic understanding of 
employer incentives and the effects of law on party behavior.  The section 
that follows draws on behavioral economics to argue that, absent some 
intervention, employers are unlikely to act optimally in identifying and 
implementing cost-effective accommodations that would assist caregivers.  
In so doing, this section lays the groundwork for corrective legislation that 
will be the subject of Part IV. 
A.  Individual Accommodation as Rational Choice 
Traditional law and economics scholars would explain employers’ 
decisions to voluntarily accommodate in terms of rational choice theory.  
Employers acting on the basis of full information will make those 
accommodations, and only those accommodations, that are utility-
maximizing as determined by a straight cost-benefit analysis.50  Suppose a 
new mother returning to work requests permission to leave one hour early 
each day to pick up her child from daycare.  In deciding whether to 
                                                                                                                          
50 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007) (“[E]conomics is the 
science of rational choice in a world . . . in which resources are limited . . . . [Its task] is to explore the 
implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his . . . ‘self-interest’.”); Russell 
Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 447 (2004) (“[T]he term ‘rational choice theory’ 
lacks a single, standard definition . . . . [M]ost versions of [rational choice theory] assume, at a 
minimum, that individuals will use all available information to select behaviors that maximize their 
expected utility.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 2010] INCENTING FLEXIBILITY 1097 
approve this arrangement, the employer will weigh the cost to the business 
of the five hours per week against the benefit of saving five hours of 
wages.  If the benefit outweighs the cost (perhaps the worker’s output is 
only negligibly reduced and the employer saves five hours’ wages), the 
employer will grant the arrangement, as it is inefficient to continue under 
the current schedule.51  If, on the other hand, the employer will suffer 
losses in excess of the wage savings (perhaps the employer will have to 
assign an employee with a higher hourly rate to cover the lost hours), the 
employer will deny the request.52 
What counts as costs and benefits in any particular situation will range 
from straightforward monetary gains and losses, as in the example above, 
to broader, more intangible considerations such as the value of the 
particular worker and the culture of the particular workplace.  For instance, 
on the cost side, an employer might weigh the possibility that the repeated 
early departure of one worker will negatively affect office morale.  If such 
a risk is likely, it may well be rational for the employer to deny the 
caregiver’s accommodation request even if the savings in wages and loss 
of five hours of performance cancel one another out or would otherwise 
suggest a gain to the company.  Similarly, on the benefit side, the employer 
might weigh the possibility that granting the accommodation will instill 
greater loyalty in the worker, which may increase her productivity and 
reduce the likelihood of absenteeism and turnover.53  This might push an 
employer to grant an accommodation that, dollar for dollar, would 
otherwise appear inefficient. 
Of course, it is not always easy for decision makers to identify or 
assign values to these variables, creating informational deficits that may 
impede rational choice.54  The point, however, is that assuming employers 
can and do undertake such a calculus, the role of regulatory law is limited 
to mandating behavior that rational employers would not otherwise 
undertake.  Figure 2 illustrates this relationship. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
51 Of course, this raises the question why the employer pays the worker for full-time work under 
the current schedule in the first place.  A utility-maximizing employer would have sought the reduction 
in working hours (or else cut the worker’s pay).  The short answer to this is that a combination of 
information deficits and cognitive biases prevent the employer from realizing the possibility of a utility 
gain.  I will turn to the operation of these impediments to rational behavior infra Part III.B.1–2. 
52 A third possibility is that the change is cost-neutral to the employer.  In such a situation the 
proposed accommodation is the Pareto superior schedule, as it will make the employee better off 
without changing the employer’s bottom line.  For this reason, I place cost-neutral accommodations 
within the category of cost-effective accommodations that the employer ought to be willing to grant 
voluntarily.  Employers, however, may lack the incentive to implement these accommodations, a 
subject addressed infra Part III.B. 
53 See WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 17–22 (summarizing data on the economic 
benefits of flexible scheduling). 
54 See infra Part III.B. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
The left side of the chart represents cost-effective and cost-neutral 
accommodations; the right side represents those that pose a net cost to 
employers.  The shaded area, section A, represents the universe of 
accommodations that employers grant voluntarily. Granted 
accommodations are co-extensive with and limited to cost-effective ones, 
except where the law specifically requires employers to absorb the cost of 
additional accommodations, represented here by the darker shaded area, 
section B, or where employers over-comply with governing mandates, 
represented here as section C.55  Employers will rationally withhold all 
other non-cost effective accommodations, represented here by section D.  
Laws mandating additional non-cost-effective accommodations from 
within section D might be justified by redistributive goals focusing on the 
relative means of employers and non-traditional workers or by normative 
goals, such as the desire to achieve results-based equality for all workers, 
but they are not market-corrective.56  In sum, absent legal mandates, there 
                                                                                                                          
55 Such over-compliance is not irrational given the cost of litigation, particularly in the context of 
an open-ended mandate (such as exists under the ADA) where the scope of the law is uncertain.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 36–39. 
56 This is at least the case when examining market failures as between the employer and the 
individual caregiver. In the ADA context, some have made the claim that the reasonable 
accommodation mandate advances aggregate utility by facilitating employment of individuals who 
would otherwise rely on the social welfare system.  See Samuel Bagenstos, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 957–75 (2003) (tracing themes of 
“welfare reform” and the “cost saving” function of the ADA in the political movement culminating in 
the statute’s adoption); Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and “Real Efficiency”: A Unified 
Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2003) (“[T]he ADA can be seen as a way for 
taxpayers to unload some of the costs of supporting the disabled population onto employers.”).  It is 
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is a set of accommodations that employers will justifiably refuse to 
implement, but also a large swath of accommodations that they will 
voluntarily undertake and to which legal regulation is seemingly irrelevant. 
B.  Individual Accommodation and the Limits on Rational Choice Theory 
But as economists themselves acknowledge, human beings do not 
always behave as rational choice theory would predict.  For a variety of 
reasons—lack of information, cognitive biases, transactions costs, and 
other impediments—individuals may make sub-optimal decisions.  In the 
context of workplace accommodations, this may mean that employers are 
under-serving caregivers (and in some instances themselves) by failing to 
make cost-neutral and even mutually advantageous accommodations. 
The recent trend toward 4/40 offers insight to the problem.  A four-day 
work week is nothing new; compressed schedules were instituted by 
hundreds of companies during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and isolated 
instances of its use date to the 1940s.57  If 4/40 is in fact the cost-effective, 
energy saving, and family-friendly policy that some employers currently 
claim, why are they only now considering its adoption?58  One possibility 
is that the 4/40 structure is cost-effective only when energy costs are 
exceptionally high, as they were in 2008 when programs such as the Utah 
initiative were unfurled.  Another possibility, however, is that employers, 
until now, failed to identify the potential value of work restructuring due to 
defects and limitations in their decisionmaking process.  Such defects may 
include informational deficits, such as a lack of knowledge or experience 
with alternative schedules, combined with high barriers to obtaining that 
information.  Or they may be the result of strong predispositions in favor of 
the status quo, skepticism about change, or other biases that employers 
were forced to re-examine in light of recent financial circumstances. 
Whatever the explanation, impediments to rational decision making are 
likely to redouble in individual accommodation situations where requests 
are made ad hoc to individual supervisors with idiosyncratic biases and a 
lack of incentive to assess long-term employer interests.  This section 
explores some of these impediments to the optimal implementation of 
individual caregiver accommodation, beginning with the problem of 
                                                                                                                          
possible that accommodation of caregivers offers comparable social benefits that, on balance, outweigh 
the costs to employers.  See WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 19–24 (suggesting that flexible 
work benefits society by encouraging labor force participation, improving worker health, and reducing 
commute time).  Whether such claims can be sustained is a question beyond the scope of this Article. 
57 See Robert C. Bird, The Four-Day Work Week: Old Lessons, New Questions, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1059, 1065 (2010). 
58 It should be noted that existing research on the positive effects of 4/40 is conflicting.  See id. at 
1066–76.  For purposes of this analysis, however, I assume that the sanguine claims of employers 
currently experimenting with 4/40 are true.  If not, however, that would merely strengthen the point that 
employers (and, a fortiori, individual managers) are often not able to assess ex ante the costs and 
benefits of any particular change in schedule. 
 1100 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1081 
information deficits and then turning to the problem of cognitive bias in 
decision making. 
1.  Information Deficits59 
At the most basic level, employers’ ability to identify and effectuate 
cost-effective accommodations is dependent on individual requests.  Not 
every caregiver who would benefit from an accommodation asks for one, 
and it is often rational for caregivers to keep silent about their personal 
needs.60  A caregiver may worry that requesting an accommodation will 
signal to the employer that she is not committed to her job61 or that the 
request will trigger subsequent discrimination or retaliation.62  Such fears 
are well grounded.  Empirical research demonstrates that working mothers 
are often perceived as lacking in competence, undependable, and 
uncommitted to their work,63 and case law supplies powerful anecdotal 
examples of how such stereotypes may translate into actual 
discrimination.64  On the other hand, female caregivers may be reluctant to 
push hard for particular benefits or concessions for fear of being viewed as 
                                                                                                                          
59 I consciously use the term “information deficits” rather than “information asymmetry,” the term 
usually adopted in law and economics literature, as information asymmetry typically refers to situations 
in which one party has information that the other does not.  See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, 
Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 523, 549 (2006) 
(explaining that after parties to a contract “learn their own valuations, they are asymmetrically 
informed” because each contains information that the other party does not have).  Such asymmetries 
are certainly present in the individual accommodation context (as where an employee knows that a 
particular schedule change would be helpful for her but does not share that information with her 
employer).  I wish to consider, however, informational impediments to optimal behavior as 
encompassing actual gaps in information suffered by both parties and which may not be feasible to 
correct (as where both the employer and employee are ignorant as to the likely effect a particular 
accommodation will have on office morale or productivity). 
60 Cf. J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (2003) (noting that in the 
disability context, job applicants may choose to keep unobservable disabilities secret, resulting in 
inefficient job matching). 
61 The problem of signaling concerns impeding workers’ ability to bargain for their preferred 
terms of employment has been explored in the context of just-cause protection.  See Walter Kamiat, 
Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible Failures of 
Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958–59 (1996) (suggesting that workers will not 
request just-cause protection for fear that they will be perceived as poor performers). 
62 Such a result could be actionable as a matter of gender discrimination law or under an 
applicable state law outlawing family responsibilities discrimination.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
§ 18.80.220 (2008) (making “parenthood” a protected characteristic under an unlawful employment 
practices statute); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2010) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the 
basis of “family responsibilities”); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 13 (discussing unlawful 
disparate treatment of female caregivers).  There is, however, currently no anti-retaliation protection for 
merely requesting an accommodation outside of the disability context. 
63 See Williams & Segal, supra note 9, at 90–91 (discussing social science stereotype studies 
whereby “career women” rated high in competence and “housewives” rated low in competence, and 
inferring that “[o]nce a woman’s status as a mother becomes salient . . . she may begin to be perceived 
as a low-competence caregiver rather than a high-competence business woman”). 
64 See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the 
plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy); see also Williams & Segal, supra 
note 9, at 122–61 (providing case examples). 
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aggressive or troublesome.  Studies of other terms of employment, such as 
salary, show that women who negotiate with their employers often are 
viewed as demanding or entitled, while men who make similar requests are 
viewed as confident and professional.65 
At the same time, managers lack any incentive to inquire into a 
worker’s caregiving responsibilities.  Such questions are correctly 
perceived to be outside the scope of a manager’s job responsibilities.  In 
addition to the risk that such questions will appear personally intrusive, the 
manager may fear being charged with discrimination.66  While employers’ 
liability concerns might be exaggerated, it is certainly good risk 
management practice for human resource personnel and defense attorneys 
to counsel companies not to inquire into workers’ immutable 
characteristics and family status.67 
Even if an employee comes forward with a request, his or her 
supervisor is unlikely to have information about the feasibility of an 
accommodation and probably has limited means of—or interest in—
making such a determination.  The Utah 4/40 plan is instructive in this 
regard.  The move to a 4/40 work week was a top-down undertaking 
spearheaded by Utah’s governor and preceded by significant study and 
budget forecasting.68  The State rolled out the plan on a trial basis and 
completed a detailed evaluation before implementing it permanently.69  In 
this way, Utah’s 4/40 plan resembled other highly publicized workplace 
restructuring initiatives aimed at such goals as securing greater racial 
diversity, eliminating the glass ceiling, or achieving improved morale and 
retention, which involved careful coordination, oversight, and study.70  
While such initiatives have been applauded as paradigmatic 
worker/management partnerships, they are relatively unique.  Few firms 
                                                                                                                          
65 See Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and 
Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 79, 107–08 (2009) (summarizing studies). 
66 Employer inquiries about family responsibilities may be used as evidence of discrimination.  
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 13 (“Relevant evidence in charges alleging disparate 
treatment of female caregivers may include . . . [w]hether the respondent asked female applicants . . . 
whether they were married or had young children, or about their childcare . . . responsibilities . . . .”).  
Such inquiries are actionable in and of themselves under some state laws.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 46a-60(a)(9) (2009) (“It shall be a discriminatory practice . . . to request or require information from 
an employee . . . relating to the individual’s child-bearing age or plans . . . or the individual’s familial 
responsibilities . . . .”). 
67 See, e.g., Williams & Segal, supra note 9, at 160 (describing how “statements supervisors make 
to mothers become embarrassing in court and can only aid plaintiffs who seek to recover”). 
68 See generally WORKING 4 UTAH, INITIATIVE PERFORMANCE REPORT, BASELINE DRAFT (2008), 
available at http://www.utah.gov/governor/docs/Working4UtahReport.pdf (forecasting economic 
impacts and various other costs, benefits, and impacts of the program launched by Utah Governor Jon 
Huntsman).  
69 See generally WORKING 4 UTAH INTERIM DRAFT, supra note 41 (following the Baseline Draft 
six months into the program’s one-year pilot period and reporting actual impacts of the program as of 
that time). 
70 See Sturm, supra note 14, at 519–20 (describing systemic overhauls implemented by 
companies, including Deloitte & Touche and Intel, to address structural gender disparities). 
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are likely to devote the resources required to investigate, assess, and 
implement a workplace restructuring for the uncertain prospect of what 
might be negligible savings.71 
The situation faced by the individual supervisor is in some ways less 
daunting, but at the same time poses a higher risk.  Consider once again the 
employee who asks her supervisor to leave one hour early each day.  The 
supervisor need not engage in the wide-scale assessment involved in a 
firm-wide initiative to determine whether to grant the particular request.  
Law and economics scholars, however, recognize that individuals are 
“boundedly rational” in the degree to which they access and process 
relevant information.72  In this case, the supervisor is unlikely to have the 
time or means to calculate or predict things such as the likely effect of the 
employee’s departure on work output, its implications for office morale, 
and its ability to generate future returns for the company in terms of 
employee loyalty and retention, all of which would be relevant to a true 
cost-benefit assessment.73  Most front-line supervisors are neither capable 
of, nor charged with, responsibility for this type of analysis.74 
Moreover, any attempt to ascertain the implications of adopting the 
accommodation, as through a trial effort, comes at significant risk to the 
individual supervisor.  If the attempted accommodation adversely affects 
production or has other negative consequences, higher-ups will hold the 
                                                                                                                          
71 See Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted, supra note 3, at 379 (describing such efforts 
as the exception rather than the rule); Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 33, at 702–03 (explaining that, 
while private firm incentives can lead to some organizational reform, the high costs of big structural 
changes may appear unjustified); WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 23 (noting that firms are 
often slow to adopt new management practices, despite their documented efficiencies, in explaining the 
absence of more widespread adoption of flexible work practices).  On the other hand, one should not 
underestimate the possibility of more spontaneous and higher risk experimentation in work 
restructuring, particularly by smaller employers or fledgling companies.  Such initiatives have received 
attention in the popular media.  See Jennifer Ludden, When Employers Make Room for Work-Life 
Balance, NPR, Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124611210& 
sc=nl&cc=nh-20100315 (describing the decision of a female executive of a 100-plus person software 
development company to allow employees to “largely set their own hours and telecommute at will” in 
recognition of employees’ need for work/life balance). 
72 Bounded rationality refers to the idea that human decision making is usually based on limited 
information and information processing.  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2003). 
73 See Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 214 (“[S]earching for and processing information does involve 
costs, in the form of time, energy, and perhaps money.  Most actors either don’t want to expend the 
resources required for comprehensive search and processing or recognize that comprehensive search 
and processing would not be achievable at any realistic cost.”). 
74 See id. 
[O]ur abilities to process information and solve problems are constrained by 
limitations of computational ability, ability to calculate consequences, ability to 
organize and utilize memory . . . . [A]ctors will often process imperfectly even the 
information they do acquire.  Such imperfections in human processing ability 
increase as decisions become more complex and involve more permutations. 
Id. 
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supervisor accountable.75  Rather than making a reasoned calculation about 
possible outcomes, therefore, a supervisor will more likely act on instinct, 
granting or denying the request based on the limited information that he or 
she already has.  Such an approach is fraught with potential for bias—a 
subject explored in the next section. 
In sum, it is unlikely that front-line supervisors will make careful 
assessments of the costs and benefits of particular accommodation 
requests.  As a result, some accommodations that would help working 
caregivers—while posing no cost to the employer or even, in some cases, 
resulting in cost savings—likely are not being implemented. 
2.  Cognitive Bias 
If supervisors are unlikely to think comprehensively about the costs 
and benefits of particular accommodation requests, how do they make 
decisions about whether to accommodate?  Law and economics scholars 
have recognized that in making choices or predictions, individuals are 
likely to rely on flawed heuristics.76  Decision makers may unduly rely on 
recent information, generalize based on particular salient experiences, 
over- or under-estimate future risk, overvalue the status quo, and take other 
cognitive shortcuts in processing information and reaching a result. 
Consistent with this description, social scientists researching social 
cognition and the operation of discriminatory bias have demonstrated that 
mental heuristics may reflect latent biases or assumptions about non-
traditional group members.77  Professor Joan Williams and other legal 
scholars have developed and applied this theory in the context of 
employers’ treatment of working caregivers.78  In making decisions, 
                                                                                                                          
75 To some extent, this reflects an agency problem.  In cases where employers stand to reap only 
long-term gains by accommodating workers, the interests of a particular manager and the company as a 
whole may deviate.  The company has a strong interest in long-term productivity and turnover 
reduction, whereas the manager may be focused on the immediate task of satisfying his discrete job 
requirements and constrained by the transaction costs entailed in evaluating and effectuating individual 
accommodations.  See George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 279 (1998). 
In all principal-agent relationships, there is a divergence of interests because of the 
separation of ownership (in the principal) and control (in the agent) of productive 
assets.  Because the agent does not reap the full reward from his efforts on the 
principal’s behalf, and because the agent knows more than the principal about what 
the agent is doing (what economists refer to as “asymmetric information”), the agent 
has the incentive and opportunity to act—whether alone or in concert with others—
in numerous ways that harm the principal’s interests. 
Id. 
76 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 218–25 (summarizing research exploring the effects of 
“defective capability” on decisionmaking processes). 
77 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) (describing 
how cognitive structures and processes involved in categorization and information processing often 
result in stereotyping). 
78 See Joan C. Williams, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using Stereotyping 
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employers may unconsciously mistreat mothers and pregnant women 
because of stereotypes about their competency and fitness for market 
work.79  Thus, absences or tardiness by a working mother may be more 
salient to an employer than the attendance record of a child-free worker, or 
the employer may be more inclined to look for—and consequently prone to 
find—deficiencies in the mother’s performance.80  As a result, the 
employer may evaluate working caregivers more harshly than traditional 
workers, provide them lower-profile work, and fail to consider them for 
promotions and key assignments for which they are otherwise qualified. 
These same heuristics may influence the way in which a supervisor 
weighs a request for an individual accommodation.  Returning to the prior 
example about the new mother who asks to leave one hour early each day, 
imagine that the mother proposes that she make up the one hour per day 
working one hour each evening from home after her children go to sleep.  
Suppose that the work in question is of the type that is transportable to a 
home environment—for instance, it involves preparing documents that can 
be done on a home computer—so that there ought to be a very limited 
effect, if any, on the employee’s marginal product.  If the supervisor 
believes, however, consciously or unconsciously, that mothers are not as 
committed to their jobs as other workers he may over-predict possible 
adverse consequences of granting the request, or make unfounded 
assumptions about how it will impact the worker’s performance.  Thus, the 
supervisor might assume that the mother will not actually perform the daily 
hour of work at home, that her performance will be affected by the 
distraction of her children, that granting the request will encourage further 
requests or shirking, or that there is no point in allowing the 
accommodation because the mother will eventually quit her job anyway. 
Of course, if such beliefs did influence the supervisor, his decision 
would in theory be actionable under basic anti-discrimination principles.  
Those laws do not require accommodation of a caregiver’s desire to work 
at home, but they do preclude consideration of gender in determining terms 
and conditions of employment.81  The new mother in this hypothetical 
                                                                                                                          
and Cognitive Bias Evidence To Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 287, 300–
01 (2003) [hereinafter Williams, Glass Ceiling] (summarizing scholarship). 
79 See Susan Huhta et al., Looking Forward and Back: Using the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
and Discriminatory Gender/Pregnancy Stereotyping To Challenge Discrimination Against New 
Mothers, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303, 318–20 (2003) (summarizing studies demonstrating that 
working mothers received competence ratings equivalent to those of elderly, retarded, and disabled 
workers, and that pregnant women received lower performance ratings than non-pregnant women 
engaging in identical behavior). 
80 See Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 77, at 1206 (explaining that where 
males and females perform a stereotypically male task poorly, the female may be more severely 
punished because the supervisor sees her performance as “dispositional” and sees the male’s 
performance as “situational”); Williams, Glass Ceiling, supra note 78, at 294 (describing “the tendency 
of in-groups to apply objective rules rigorously to outsiders but flexibly to insiders”). 
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (2006); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 13 (“[S]tereotypes 
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could bring a “discriminatory failure to accommodate” claim.82  In this 
scenario, the reason (or a reason) for the denial of the requested 
accommodation was based on gender stereotype.  The difficulty, however, 
is that such adverse actions often masquerade as legitimate business 
decisions, particularly where the influence of bias is subtle or unconscious.  
One is only likely to be able to prove the effect of cognitive bias where 
statements or stray remarks reflect the decision makers’ stereotypical 
beliefs or where the existence of more favorably-treated comparators 
creates an inference that stereotype influenced the decision.83  Thus, it is 
likely that supervisors, in at least a subset of cases, are making decisions 
about individual accommodations that are not only sub-optimal, but also 
discriminatory, and which are currently going undetected (and 
unremedied) by existing law. 
Just as employers may rely on heuristics built in part on stereotypes 
about working caregivers, they may also rely on heuristics based in an 
essentialistic understanding of the proper structure of work.  In the early 
departure hypothetical, the supervisor not only makes judgments about the 
worker herself—whether she is “deserving” of the accommodation, 
whether she will in fact work at home, and whether it is in the company’s 
interest to invest in her retention—he also makes judgments about the 
viability of the accommodation in light of the company’s business needs.  
He may wonder whether the departure will disrupt other workers or 
working relationships, whether it will negatively affect office morale, 
whether it will limit his ability to monitor and supervise work, or whether 
it will adversely affect the quality of the goods or services the company 
provides. 
In the context of any particular accommodation decision, such 
concerns may be legitimate or they may be overstated.  In the current 
example, the requested time away from the office is limited to one hour per 
day, so problems owing to lost “face time” at work ought to be de minimis.  
Yet, there are many reasons why the supervisor might exaggerate these 
                                                                                                                          
that female caregivers should not, will not, or cannot be committed to their jobs are sex-based, 
employment decisions [that] violate Title VII.”). 
82 Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 34. 
83 Cases involving explicit stereotype-based statements about pregnant and working mothers are 
not infrequent.  See Huhta et al., supra note 79, at 320–21.  On the other hand, caregivers’ ability to 
win discrimination cases using comparator evidence is often hampered by court decisions requiring the 
situation of the proffered comparators to be almost indistinguishable from the plaintiff herself.  See, 
e.g., Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distrib. Co., 356 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (upholding a jury 
verdict for an employer charged with discriminatory failure to accommodate a pregnant truck driver 
seeking light duty despite the fact that the employer had a policy of accommodating male drivers 
injured on the job and had previously accommodated some male drivers injured off the job, implicitly 
accepting the employer’s contention that the pregnant driver was not similarly situated to male workers 
unable to lift due to work injuries); see also Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving 
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 238–39 (2009) (critiquing the strict view of 
relevant comparators and urging an objective evaluation of comparability guided by expert testimony). 
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risks.  Professor Michelle Travis has demonstrated that in assessing failure 
to accommodate claims under the ADA, courts betray a very narrow view 
of the appropriate structure of work, treating the FTFT norm as an essential 
and inevitable component of the job.84  Thus, courts routinely hold that 
requests to work from home, alter attendance requirements, or change 
work schedules are unreasonable and have consistently denied claims 
based on an employer’s failure to provide these types of 
accommodations.85 
The same tendency may occur when supervisors vet individual 
accommodation requests not only from disabled workers but from 
caregivers as well.  Thus, a supervisor presented with a request to work 
reduced hours, work on a flexible schedule, or work from home may 
perceive these accommodations as inherently inconsistent with work norms 
even in situations where, from an objective perspective, they are unlikely 
to pose any cost to the employer.  Such a view may in part be explained by 
the empirically documented effect of status quo allocations.  Studies 
demonstrate that in a variety of contexts, from exchanges of goods to 
changes in the state of the world, individuals systematically favor 
maintaining their current situation over an equally valuable alternative.86  
In effect, individuals exact a premium in negotiating for change and will 
ask more for giving up what they currently enjoy than they would pay to 
acquire it in the first place. 87 
In the individual accommodation context this would mean that a 
supervisor will place undue value on maintaining existing work rules and 
structures.  The supervisor may prefer having each worker perform all 
eight hours of work at the work site to working one hour from home even 
if all other aspects of the alternative arrangement are objectively equal.  If 
                                                                                                                          
84 See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 3, at 23. 
85 See Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted, supra note 3, at 365–66 (providing case 
examples); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 3, at 25–28 (same).  An interesting question is whether this 
tendency is likely to change as flexible work practices grow more prevalent.  There is some case 
support to suggest that employees can be successful in seeking accommodations that violate the FTFT 
norm where such deviations were previously tolerated by the employer.  See, e.g., Jacobs v. Marietta 
Mem’l Hosp., 2010 WL 749897, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2010) (denying summary judgment to an 
employer on a bipolar worker’s claim of unreasonable failure to accommodate request to work 
occasionally from home on a flexible schedule where plaintiff had successfully maintained that work 
arrangement for eight years prior to its discontinuation by a new supervisor); Graffius v. Shinseki, 672 
F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding a material issue of fact as to whether allowing the plaintiff 
to telecommute would pose an undue hardship in light of her job description and the fact that she had 
previously received a high performance evaluation while telecommuting). 
86 Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 
625 (1998). 
87 See id. at 627. If individuals valued particular states of the world without reference to pre-
existing allocations, they would value the cost to achieve or acquire that state of the world the same as 
they would to give that state up.  Controlled experiments, however, consistently reveal a gap between 
the price individuals are willing to pay to acquire an object or achieve a particular state of the world 
and the price they are willing to accept to sell that same object or relinquish that state of the world.  Id. 
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so, cost effective accommodations that parties should ordinarily implement 
as a matter of rational choice may, in some situations, be denied. 
C.  Voluntary Accommodation Revisited 
The previous section argued that, in contrast to the conclusions of 
rational choice theory, cost effective accommodations will not necessarily 
be granted by employers voluntarily.  Supervisors’ decisions may be based 
on limited or inaccurate information, subtly influenced by bias toward 
working caregivers, or reflect an intractable desire to preserve the status 
quo. 
For these reasons, the universe of individual accommodations that are 
currently granted to caregivers likely looks less like Figure 2 and more like 
the following:  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the actual state of voluntary accommodation.  In 
contrast to Figure 2, only a portion of the cost-effective accommodations 
on the left side of the graph are in fact voluntarily implemented.  Thus, 
shaded section A, representing voluntarily provided accommodations, is 
significantly smaller than the full universe of cost-effective 
accommodations.  The rest of that half of the graph (sections A1 and A2) 
represents those situations in which a cost-effective accommodation is not 
achieved due to information deficits, cognitive bias, or any number of 
other possible limitations on rational choice.  The denial of some number 
of these cost-effective accommodations likely owes to bias against 
caregivers as a class, and may therefore constitute actionable gender 
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discrimination (represented here as section A2).  Importantly, though, even 
assuming that all denials based on group bias were adequately redressed by 
existing discrimination law, there remains a universe of cost-effective 
accommodations that parties fail to achieve due to market breakdown and 
that ought to be addressed through legal intervention. 
IV.  THE ROLE OF LAW IN INCENTING VOLUNTARY ACCOMMODATION  
This section returns to the question of law and the role it might play in 
light of both the potential for and the limitations of voluntary 
accommodation.  As described in Part II, there are various challenges 
inherent in crafting legislation that mandates caregiver accommodation.  If 
the goal of legal intervention, however, is not to impose particular 
obligations on employers, but to facilitate the discovery of mutually 
beneficial accommodations, then other options present.  Pending 
legislation creating a statutory “right to request” flexible work offers an 
example.  The Working Families Flexibility Act (the “WFFA” or the 
“Act”), modeled on the 2002 Right to Request Law adopted in the United 
Kingdom,88 creates and protects a worker’s procedural right to apply for a 
change in schedule.89  The law imposes no obligation on the employer to 
accept the worker’s proposal and therefore is unlikely to affect widespread 
work restructuring or individual accommodations that impose significant 
costs on employers.  If adopted, however, the law may lead workers and 
employers to identify and implement cost-effective accommodations that 
they might otherwise have ignored or overlooked.  This section considers 
the benefits and limitations of such a law with an eye toward correcting the 
impediments to optimal voluntary accommodation presented in Part III. 
A.  The Working Families Flexibility Act 
Introduced in the House of Representatives in March 2009, the WFFA 
sets forth a new procedural right under which full- and part-time workers 
may “apply” to their employer for a change in employment terms.90  
Specifically, the law sanctions employee requests pertaining to the hours, 
times, and location where the employee is required to work.91  In effect, the 
law targets those aspects of work structure that comprise the FTFT norm, 
and that are often the most onerous to working caregivers. 
While the Act places no substantive obligations on the employer, it 
does several things to enhance the process by which individual 
accommodation requests are posed and vetted.  While nominally designed 
                                                                                                                          
88 Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/ 
pdf/ukpga_20020022_en.pdf. 
89 Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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to assist working families, the right to request applies to all workers who 
meet basic eligibility requirements, not just caregivers.92  The fact that the 
ability to request is declared a right available to everyone may encourage 
workers to come forward93 and may in particular reduce the stigma 
associated with the special needs of caregivers.94  In addition, the Act 
protects those who propose changes in employment terms from subsequent 
retaliation by their employer.95  Workers subjected to adverse action based 
on their invocation of rights under the Act may recover equitable relief 
including backpay.96  As a strategic matter, this provision should reduce 
the need for a plaintiff caregiver to identify a gender-based motivation for 
a subsequent adverse action in order to challenge that conduct under 
traditional anti-discrimination law.  Whereas a plaintiff proceeding under 
the latter statute would have to demonstrate that the employer’s response to 
her accommodation request was influenced by gender stereotype, the Act 
creates a direct cause of action for adverse treatment based on the 
plaintiff’s need for an altered schedule.97  In this way, the Act reduces the 
risks inherent in coming forward with individual requests. 
                                                                                                                          
92 See id. § 2(1) (defining “employee” as an individual “who has worked an average of at least 20 
hours per week or . . . at least 1,000 hours per year”).  In this respect, the Act differs substantially from 
its European precursors such as the U.K.’s Right to Request Law, which originally applied to parents of 
children under the age of six and now applies to those with children under the age of seventeen, as well 
as those who care for a disabled child or adult. 
93 On the value of rights and identity, see DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF 
INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 78–80, 104– 
05 (2003); Catherine Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing Discourses 
and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 27–28 
(2005). 
94 Per this theory, some scholars have argued that working women will not achieve equal 
employment quality until men seek workplace accommodations for caregiving.  See, e.g., Martin H. 
Malin, Fathers and Paternal Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1095 (1994) (suggesting that improving 
parental leave policies will benefit women because “[t]he lack of good paternal leave policies also 
encourages workplace discrimination against women of childbearing age”); Michael Selmi, Family 
Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 708 (2000) (“[I]f there is to be greater equality 
for women in the workplace, it will be necessary for men to change their behavior, both in and out of 
the workplace, before employers will begin to change theirs.”).  Of course, this problem will not go 
away if, despite the WFFA’s broad applicability, it is invoked primarily by women.  Such has been the 
experience with the FMLA, which is also gender-neutral.  See Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 479–80 (2008) (summarizing Department of Labor statistics on FMLA usage, 
which demonstrate that men use FMLA leave less often than do women and that they do so primarily 
for their own health needs rather than to care for others); Chuck Halverson, From Here to Paternity: 
Why Men Are Not Taking Paternity Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 260–61 (2003) (same).  Unlike the FMLA, however, the WFFA is not only gender-
neutral—it applies to caregivers and non-caregivers alike. 
95 Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. § 5(b) (2009). 
96 Id. § 7(a)(2). 
97 Instead, the plaintiff will presumably have to prove that the request triggered the adverse action.  
While this is likely to be a difficult task in itself, the plaintiff is no longer saddled with the problem of 
unearthing comparators whose treatment varied by gender.  See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 
F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the plaintiff could prevail on a discrimination claim 
based on the employer’s unwillingness to tolerate her pregnancy-related tardiness and leave 
requirements only if the employer would have fired “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe, who is as tardy as Ms. 
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The Act also imposes a number of procedural requirements on an 
employer who receives a statutory request.  The employer must hold a 
meeting with the worker within fourteen days of the request.98  It must 
subsequently provide a written decision on the request that explains the 
reason for any denial, which may include such things as the resources of 
the employer, the costs posed by the change in terms, potential effects of 
the change on customers, and other managerial concerns.99  The employer 
must also follow a similar procedure in the event the employee requests 
reconsideration of her proposal following a denial.100  Any refusal to 
follow these procedures may result in a civil penalty of up to $5000.101 
These provisions lay out what is essentially a methodology for 
evaluating individual accommodation requests.  In this way, the “right to 
request” may be helpful in overcoming some of the cognitive and 
informational limitations that likely plague unregulated supervisory 
decision making.  At a minimum, the Act forces a degree of mutual 
information disclosure.  Workers who wish to be accommodated must 
describe their preferences and needs; supervisors charged with evaluating 
requests must communicate about their managerial and cost concerns.  
Such a process could lead to the shared discovery of viable solutions that 
would not otherwise have been identified.  It could also encourage more 
aggressive efforts by supervisors to acquire information about the business 
implications of a particular accommodation.  Because the supervisor will 
have to meet with the applicant, and ultimately provide a written decision, 
he must invest some time and forethought to the stakes of the decision, 
including short- and long-term effects of the requested accommodation.  In 
some cases, this could produce more deliberative results grounded in facts 
rather than purely reflexive responses based on limited information and 
supposition. 
While there is little to suggest that the WFFA’s sponsors had the 
particular problem of information deficits in mind, overcoming those types 
of obstacles to accommodation is clearly a goal of the British Right to 
Request Law on which the WFFA is modeled.  That law, which dates to 
2002 and grants working parents a comparable right to request flexible 
work, is premised on the idea that employers stand to benefit from flexible 
schedules but are ill-informed both about the needs of their workers and 
the possibilities for change.  Guidance interpreting the law suggests that 
the goal is to put both parties on the same side of the table where they can 
                                                                                                                          
Troupe was, also because of health problems, and who is about to take a protracted sick leave growing 
out of those problems at an expense to [the employer] equal to that of Ms. Troupe’s maternity leave”). 
98 H.R. 1274 § 4(b)(1)(A). 
99 Id. § 4(b)(1)(B)–(C). 
100 Id. § 4(b)(1)(E)–(K). 
101 Id. § 7(a)(1). 
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educate one another and realize mutually advantageous 
accommodations.102 
In this respect, both the WFFA and its British counterpart are 
reminiscent of the well-established interactive process protocol imposed 
under disability law.  Regulations interpreting the ADA counsel employers 
who receive an accommodation request, or have reason to know of a 
worker’s disability, to “initiate an informal, interactive process” with the 
worker.103  Courts have held that an interactive process is mandatory and, 
in some instances, have divined a prima facie case of unlawful failure to 
accommodate from the employer’s refusal to engage in that process.104  
Courts so holding recognize that good process is an essential component in 
identifying and achieving viable accommodations consistent with the 
statute.  Indeed, the interactive process requirement has been credited with 
enhancing compliance and effecting numerous accommodations outside 
the litigation context.105 
It is also possible that the WFFA’s procedural requirements will help 
alleviate some of the effects of subconscious discriminatory bias.  Social 
science research has determined that subconscious bias is especially likely 
to exert influence in situations calling for the exercise of discretionary 
judgment.106  The procedure set forth in the WFFA could ideally replace 
                                                                                                                          
102 See U.K. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., FLEXIBLE WORKING: THE RIGHT TO REQUEST AND THE 
DUTY TO CONSIDER 2 (2003). 
103 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2009). 
104 See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
“[a]lmost all of the circuits to rule on the question have held that an employer has a mandatory 
obligation to engage in the interactive process” and concluding that the employer breached that duty 
where it summarily rejected all three of plaintiff’s proposed accommodations, including a “low-tech” 
lifting device that “may well have been an adequate reasonable accommodation,” and offered no 
practical alternatives), vacated on other grounds, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); 
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633–34 (7th Cir. 1998) (declining to grant an employer 
summary judgment because factual dispute remained as to whether the employer caused the breakdown 
in the interactive process by failing to place plaintiff in a temporary position and failing to inform him 
of a position open to job-bidding); Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 F. Supp. 2d 485, 513–16 
(N.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment for the employer on a 
failure-to-accommodate claim where plaintiff’s evidence suggested that the employer delayed the 
interactive process and withheld information about job openings). 
105 See Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 56 (speculating that 
the ADA interactive process requirement “is giving disabled workers a leg up in negotiating with their 
employers and, as a consequence, is achieving favorable, cooperatively designed solutions under the 
radar of reported case law”); Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 615, 626 (2004) (“The interactive process contemplated by the ADA is a unique 
procedural device that has launched untold numbers of successful workplace accommodations.”); cf. 
Travis, Lashing Back, supra note 9, at 359–63 (describing how, in addition to leading to 
accommodation of the disabled, formalized procedures implemented in response to the interactive 
process requirement yield residual benefits to non-disabled workers). 
106 On this basis, some legal scholars have set forth substantive theories of employer liability for 
structural discrimination in situations where managers are left to act on unguided discretion.  See, e.g., 
Green, supra note 14, at 145 (proposing a “structural account of disparate treatment theory [that] would 
hold employers directly liable under Title VII for organizational choices, institutional practices, and 
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unstructured decision making by individual supervisors with a more 
focused review of relevant business considerations.  The operation of 
subconscious bias may also be tempered by the Act’s requirement that the 
parties meet, at least one time, to discuss the worker’s application.107  
Social science research suggests that contextual factors, such as immediate 
exposure to subjects of negative stereotypes, can impact the degree to 
which bias manifests in subsequent decisions.108  In one notable 
experiment, the presence of an African American test administrator 
resulted in a reduction in the degree of automatic prejudice subjects 
exhibited during the subsequent diagnostic.109  In the context of a right to 
request, the requirement that the employer actually meet with the 
individual could serve as the immediate corrective exposure that mitigates 
the effects of negative stereotypes about caregivers. 
B.  Implications for Voluntary Accommodation 
Undoubtedly, this is a highly optimistic take on the significance of the 
WFFA.  Perhaps it is too optimistic.  A procedural mandate certainly will 
not eliminate all of the innate biases and limitations associated with human 
decision making.  Supervisors may develop a more expansive view of the 
range of possible accommodations, but they are not likely to become better 
forecasters of the productivity and retention effects of granting them.110  In 
the same vein, stereotyping and other forms of bias are innate components 
of human cognition, and certain effects on judgment will likely persist 
even in the face of positive exposure and extended dialogue.111 
Perhaps more problematic is the risk that the delineated procedures 
specified in the Act will operate as a script for compliance that 
                                                                                                                          
workplace dynamics that enable the operation of discriminatory bias”); Melissa Hart, Learning from 
Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355, 373–74 (2006) (discussing the importance and 
legitimacy of class action suits challenging big box employers’ use of subjective and decentralized 
decision making as enabling the operation of cognitive bias). 
107 Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. § 4(b)(1)(A) (2009). 
108 See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 455, 456 (2003) (summarizing research indicating that “contextual factors 
can systematically shift self-reported attitudes and beliefs”). 
109 Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 845 (2001); see also Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. 
Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images 
of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806 (2001) 
(suggesting that exposure to pictures of admired and disliked exemplars can reduce automatic 
preference for white over black Americans). 
110 See Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 214–16 (describing how achieving an optimal outcome may 
require individuals to limit acquisition of information that is costly to discover, resulting in “rational 
ignorance”). 
111 See Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1158–67 (1999) 
(summarizing experimental research that calls into question the human ability to correct or control for 
the operation of discriminatory bias). 
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overshadows the thoughtful process the Act ought to encourage.112  In this 
way, the WFFA may go both too far and not far enough in its efforts to 
ensure procedural fairness.  The Act identifies the precise steps required of 
employers and imposes a penalty in the event those steps are not 
followed.113  It fails, however, to establish any standard of review by which 
employers are to judge applications or to impose any general duty on the 
employer in terms of the quality of its vetting process. 
Regulatory and judicial interpretation could ultimately fill that gap.  
Such has been the case under the ADA, where courts have not only 
required parties to participate in the interactive process recommended by 
the regulations, but to do so in good faith.  Thus, courts have looked to the 
quality of the employer’s participation—the speed of its response, its 
willingness to experiment with a proposed accommodation , its efforts to 
accumulate information, its attentiveness to employee suggestions—to 
determine whether the employer meaningfully engaged in the interactive 
process with an intent and desire to reach a viable accommodation.114 
                                                                                                                          
112 Such critiques have been levied, not without justification, in the context of sexual harassment 
law under which an employer must demonstrate that it engaged in preventative and corrective action in 
order to avoid liability for a hostile work environment.  See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 764–65 (1998) (holding that an employer may avoid liability if it can show that it exercised 
reasonable care to prevent, and swiftly remedy, any sexually harassing behavior, and that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive and corrective opportunities that the 
employer provided to mitigate the risk of harm to the employee); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (same).  The general consensus among commentators is that this rule has resulted 
in superficial efforts by employers to deter hostile conduct—efforts that are often credited by courts but 
actually do little to eliminate sexual harassment.  See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a 
Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and 
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 (2001) 
(emphasizing the absence of empirical support for the “widely held and rarely questioned” belief that 
corporate anti-discrimination training deters harassment and discrimination and suggesting that such 
programs might even polarize workers and undermine legal rights); Anne Lawton, Operating in an 
Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 
198 (2004) (observing that “courts reward employers for developing and distributing nicely worded 
harassment policies and procedures,” which do not necessarily deter sexual harassment in the 
workplace); John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The 
Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory 
Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2002) 
(“To trigger [the] safe harbor [under Ellerth and Faragher], all an employer has to do is promulgate a 
harassment complaint procedure.”); David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel 
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the 
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2001) 
(concluding that the message to be gleaned by employers from lower court rulings post-Ellerth and 
Faragher is that “to limit liability [employers] should exercise just enough reasonable care to satisfy a 
court, but not enough to make it easy or comfortable for employees to complain of workplace 
harassment”).  But see Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 15, at 48–50 
(acknowledging anti-plaintiff results under the Ellerth-Faraghar rule but arguing that these are due to a 
misinterpretation and unjustified expansion of the Supreme Court’s decisions by lower courts and do 
not suggest the inevitability of “paper compliance” by employers). 
113 Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. §§ 4(b)(1)(A)–(M), 7(a)(1) (2009). 
114 Compare Salgado-Candelario v. Ericsson Caribbean, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168–71 
(D.P.R. 2008) (finding a triable issue on the employer’s breach of the good faith interactive process 
requirement where the plaintiff-employee’s supervisor asked for repeated doctors’ notes, employer’s 
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The same type of inquiry could be applied to an employer’s handling 
of a request under the WFFA.  Indeed, British tribunals interpreting the 
U.K. Right to Request Law appear to be doing just that.  The decision in 
Commotion Ltd. v. Rutty provides an example.115  There, the employee-
appellant was a full-time warehouse worker who became the principal 
caretaker of her young granddaughter.  As a result, she made an application 
under the Right to Request Law to reduce her work hours to a part-time 
schedule.116  The company met with the employee, per the statute, and 
issued a written denial of the request.  Among other things, the employer 
asserted that there would be a “detrimental impact on performance” if the 
request were granted and cited the need to “help create a team spirit by 
having a uniform working day.”117  On the employee’s subsequent claim 
under the Right to Request Law, the Employment Tribunal held that the 
employer had not complied with its statutory requirements.118  Affirming 
this decision, the Employment Appeal Tribunal explained: 
There is . . . a sliding scale of the considerations which a 
Tribunal may be permitted to enter into in looking at such a 
refusal.  The one end is the possibility that all that the 
employer has to do is to state his ground and there can be no 
investigation of the correctness or accuracy or truthfulness of 
that ground.  At the other end is perhaps a full enquiry 
looking to see whether the employer has acted fairly, 
reasonably, and sensibly in putting forward that ground.  
Neither extreme is the position, in our judgment . . . . The 
true position . . . is that the Tribunal is entitled to look at the 
assertion made by the employer[,] i.e.[,] the ground which he 
asserts is the reason why he has not granted the application[,] 
and to see whether it is factually correct. . . . 
In order for the Tribunal to establish [this] . . . the 
Tribunal must examine the evidence as to the circumstances 
surrounding the situation to which the application gave rise.  
In doing so, the Tribunal are entitled to enquire into what 
                                                                                                                          
written replies to the employee’s submissions and those of her physician were repetitive and non-
responsive, and the employer delayed closing an air duct as an accommodation to the employee 
because she had not provided a “specific medical order” stating there was a temperature problem), with 
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871–72 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no lack of good 
faith where the employer sought to meet directly with the plaintiff employee, the employer’s personnel 
were “open” and “professional” in talking to the employee’s rehabilitation counselor, and 
representatives visited the production line where the employee worked to try to identify appropriate 
alternative jobs).  
115 Commotion Ltd. v. Rutty, [2006] I.R.L.R. 171 (EAT). 
116 Id. at 172–73. 
117 Id. at 173. 
118 Id. at 175. 
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would have been the effect of granting the application.  
Could it have been coped with without disruption?  What did 
other staff feel about it?  Could they make up the time?  
[A]nd matters of that type.119 
Thus, the scope of inquiry for determining a procedural violation under 
British law clearly exceeds a checklist review of the employer’s actions.  
Applying the standard articulated above, the Appeal Tribunal sanctioned 
the Employment Tribunal’s finding in favor of the employee based on the 
fact that the employer had produced no information to support its claim 
that working as a part-time warehouse assistant was “not feasible.”120  As 
the lower tribunal concluded:  “There has not been a shred of evidence that 
proper enquiry and proper investigation was carried out by the [employer] 
when dealing with [the employee’s] request.”121  Thus, it is clear that 
courts can and will draw a line between reflexive decisions and thoughtful 
process where the law sanctions this approach.122 
Finally, there is empirical evidence to support the conclusion that good 
process can achieve good outcomes.  The most recent available study of 
the effects of the Right to Request Law in the United Kingdom, which has 
been in place since 2002, found that sixty percent of requests were fully 
accepted by employers and that another eighteen percent were partially 
accepted.123  The overwhelming majority—eighty-seven percent—were 
accepted outright without need for the employee to resort to an appeal.124  
The types of requests ranged from requests for reduced hours or part-time 
status, to requests for flexible hours or changes in schedule, to requests to 
work at home or receive assistance with the employee’s workload.125  
There were no statistically significant differences in the rate of employers’ 
acceptance of proposals based on the type of request.126  In short, 
employers willingly deviated from the FTFT norm to accommodate a 
range of individual needs in the precise manner requested by a significant 
majority of employees. 
                                                                                                                          
119 Id. at 177. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 175. 
122 I have presented this argument more expansively in my prior work proposing an 
“organizational justice” approach to caregiver equality.  Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private 
Process, supra note 15, at 56–58 (proposing the adoption of an amendment to the FMLA that would 
require employers to engage in a good faith interactive process upon a worker’s request for and return 
from leave). 
123 HÜLYA HOOKER ET AL., INST. FOR EMP. STUD., EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS RESEARCH SERIES 
NO. 58, THE THIRD WORK-LIFE BALANCE EMPLOYEE SURVEY: MAIN FINDINGS 57 (2007), available at  
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file38388.pdf. 
124 Id. at 58. 
125 Id. at 55–56. 
126 Id. at 58. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I return to the 4/40 work week.  What does the recent 
popularity of alternative work schedules portend for the future?  Ten years 
from now, should we expect 4/40 to be the new full-time standard?  
Somehow, I suspect not.  At the moment, we have no empirical data about 
the scope of this trend, only media attention to a few high-profile programs 
initiated primarily by government employers.  As this Symposium Issue 
goes to press, it has been many months since the newspapers have focused 
on this particular initiative.  As fuel prices stabilize and the economy 
recovers, 4/40 may go by the wayside just as it did in the 1970s when 
employer interest in novel forms of work restructuring peeked and waned 
amidst uncertainty as to its ultimate benefit.127 
But whatever happens with 4/40, the intractable problem of work/life 
balance remains and grows increasingly urgent.  A recent report from the 
Executive Office of the President, describes workplace flexibility as an 
economic imperative given the changing needs and demographics of a 
“21st century workforce.”128  A key point of this Article has been that the 
goal of improving the lives of working caregivers transcends any particular 
form of work restructuring and must not be assessed as a problem of 
proscription.  Whether initiated by an employer or imposed by legislation, 
any singular, top-down requirement as to the appropriate structure of work 
will help some workers and hurt others.  What is needed is not one type of 
reform so much as an overarching flexibility about possible work structure.  
Flexibility is a much harder animal to legislate. 
In this way, 4/40 does matter.  It is a testament to the possibility of 
voluntary efforts by employers to change work structure in ways that 
accommodate working caregivers.  This is not to say that reliance on 
voluntary employer action must supplant other strategies in pursuit of 
change.  Certainly the strategic use of discrimination laws to root out 
stereotypes about the fitness of caregivers for market work must continue, 
and it is possible that we will yet see enhanced substantive benefits for 
caregivers.129  But employer-sponsored voluntary action can be a 
                                                                                                                          
127 See Bird, supra note 57, at 1078–79. 
128 WORK-LIFE BALANCE, supra note 46, at 24–26.  While the report does not mention 4/40, it 
describes and supports a variety of flexible work arrangements “in terms of when one works, where one 
works, or how much one works” including “arrangements such as job sharing, phased retirement of 
older workers, and telecommuting, that allow workers to continue making productive contributions to 
the workforce while also attending to family and other responsibilities.”  Id. at Executive Summary. 
129 While the various strategies discussed here do not conflict with one another, I am mindful of 
the practical reality that the resources required to enact legislation are not unlimited.  It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to speculate as to whether the WFFA would ultimately yield greater benefits to 
workers than would a substantive enactment like the pending Family and Medical Leave Enhancement 
Act, which would expand the FMLA to cover more employers and more routine parental obligations.  
See Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 824 111th Cong. (2009).  I do believe, 
however, that the WFFA is the more likely of the two to gain passage and for this reason would 
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meaningful part of that process, and its value can be enhanced through the 
operation of law.  Legislation such as the WFFA, which offers a narrow 
and, perhaps for that reason, politically viable approach to incentivizing 
employer flexibility, provides a promising example. 
                                                                                                                          
recommend that advocates invest their political capital first and foremost in its enactment. 
